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1Abstract
Research suggests that teenage childbearing adversely affects both the outcomes of the 
mothers as well as those of their children.  We know that low-educated women are more 
likely to have a teenage birth, but does this imply that policies that increase educational 
attainment reduce early fertility?  This paper investigates whether increasing mandatory 
educational attainment through compulsory schooling legislation encourages women to 
delay childbearing.  We use variation induced by changes in compulsory schooling laws 
in both the United States and Norway to estimate the effect in two very different 
institutional environments.  We find evidence that increased compulsory schooling does 
in fact reduce the incidence of teenage childbearing in both the United States and 
Norway, and these results are quite robust to  various specification checks.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, we also find that the magnitude of these effects is quite similar in the two 
countries.  These results suggest that legislation aimed at improving educational 
outcomes may have spillover effects onto the fertility decisions of teenagers. 
Key words: Teenage childbearing, Education, Educational reform. 
JEL Classification: I21, J13, J24.
21. Introduction
Research suggests that teenage childbearing adversely affects women?s economic 
outcomes such as the level of completed schooling, labor market participation, and 
wages.1 Given these deleterious consequences, it is important to determine what factors 
contribute to this decision. We know that low-educated women are more likely to have a 
teenage birth, but does this imply that policies that increase educational attainment reduce 
early fertility?  In particular, would increasing mandatory educational attainment 
(through compulsory schooling legislation) encourage women to delay childbearing? If 
compulsory schooling reduces harmful or risky behaviors, then these factors should be 
considered when evaluating the benefits of this type of legislation. 
This paper proposes to provide evidence on the causal effects of changes in 
compulsory schooling laws on teenage childbearing using data from the United States 
and Norway.  Having data from these two countries provides an interesting contrast:  one 
country is very supportive of teenagers who have children, with extensive financial 
support (Norway), while the other is much more punitive in its treatment (the United 
States).  Understanding the differences in responses to compulsory schooling laws can 
provide useful information, not only on the direct effect of schooling laws on teenage 
fertility, but also the relative difference across different institutional environments. 
In the United States, there has been extensive variation in compulsory schooling 
laws across states and over time. Changes in these laws have been used as instruments for 
education in other contexts by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Lochner and Moretti 
(2004), and Lleras-Muney (2002). There were many changes in minimum schooling 
3requirements between the 1920s and the 1970s; we utilize changes over this entire time 
period by using data from the Census from 1940 through 1980 to analyze cohorts born 
between 1910 and 1960. 
During the 1960s in Norway, there was a drastic change in the compulsory 
schooling laws affecting primary and middle schools.  Pre-reform, the Norwegian 
education system required children to attend school through the seventh grade; after the 
reform, this was extended to the ninth grade, adding two years of required schooling.  
Implementation of the reform occurred in different municipalities at different times, 
starting in 1960 and continuing through 1972, allowing for regional as well as time series 
variation.  Evidence in the literature suggests that these reforms had a large and 
significant impact on educational attainment.2 We study cohorts impacted by the reform -
- women born between 1947 and 1958. 
Our results suggest that increased compulsory schooling does seem to reduce the 
incidence of teenage childbearing in both the United States and Norway.  These findings 
suggest that policy interventions to increase female education at the lower tail of the 
educational distribution may be an effective means of reducing rates of teenage 
childbearing. 
Once this relationship is established, it is then useful to attempt to understand the 
mechanisms through which this relationship works.  We examine two possible 
mechanisms.  The first is the ?incarceration effect?; to the extent that compulsory 
schooling reduces the time available to engage in risky behavior, the incidence of teenage 
1 See Klepinger, Lundberg, and Plotnick (1999), Angrist and Evans (1996), and Levine and Painter (2003). 
2 See Black, Devereux and Salavanes (2003). Results on the impact of similar reforms on educational 
attendance also exists for Sweden, see Meghir and Palme (2003) and for England and Ireland, see Harmon 
and Walker (1995) and Oreopulos (2003). 
4pregnancy might go down.  The second is the ?human capital effect?; additional 
education increases both current and expected future human capital and this higher level 
of human capital could change fertility decisions.  We describe these mechanisms in 
more detail and discuss possible tests to distinguish between them.  Our estimates suggest 
that the effect of the laws on fertility is not just an ?incarceration? effect, resulting also 
from the effects of the laws on human capital accumulation. 
The paper unfolds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we provide a short overview of 
the literature and brief descriptions of the support systems for single mothers in Norway 
and the U.S., as well as a description of the compulsory schooling law changes used for 
identification. Sections 4 and 5 present our estimation strategy and the data sets used. 
Section 6 presents the estimation results and robustness checks. In Section 7, attempts are 
made to disentangle some possible explanations for a causal relationship between 
compulsory schooling laws and fertility choice. Section 8 concludes.  
2.  Background Information 
2.1 Previous literature 
 Teenage motherhood has been associated with many long-term economic and 
health disadvantages such as lower education, less work experience and lower wages, 
welfare dependence, lower birth weights, higher rates of infant mortality, and higher rates 
of participation in crime (Ellwood, 1988; Jencks, 1989; Hoffman et al., 1993; Kiernan, 
1997). There is an ongoing debate as to the extent that these adverse effects of teen 
childbearing are truly caused by having a teen birth rather than reflecting unobserved 
family background differences.  (See Hotz et al. 2002 for an example). However, the 
5balance of evidence suggests that at least part of the negative consequences of teen births 
on mothers is causal (Klepinger, Lundberg, and Plotnick, 1999; Angrist and Evans, 1996; 
Levine and Paintner, 2003). Thus, as a policy matter, efforts to reduce the rate of teen 
childbearing are often considered as a strategy to improve the life chances of young 
women. 
 In addition to the effects of teen childbearing on mothers, there is also a literature 
concerned with the negative effects on children. In recent work, Francesconi (2004) takes 
a family fixed effects approach to show that children born to teenagers have poorer 
outcomes as adults than children born to women when older. In addition, Hunt (2003) 
provides evidence that children of teen mothers are more likely to engage in crime. Thus, 
the policy interest in this topic also arises from presumed negative effects on children. 
 Despite the policy relevance, there has been little work studying the role of 
education policy in reducing teen fertility. A recent paper by McCrary and Royer (2003) 
focuses on two states (California and Texas) and examines the effect of education on 
teenage childbearing and child health by applying a regression discontinuity approach 
using school starting-age rules.  They find little evidence that the induced educational 
changes affect children?s health or woman?s fertility choices.  However, while their data 
set is very well-suited for studying children?s health (administrative data on all births in 
California and Texas from 1989 to 2001), it is less appropriate for focusing on teenage 
fertility decisions (as it contains a sample of only those women who did in fact have 
children).  We attempt to enhance our understanding of the link between teenage fertility 
and education by using data that is better suited for this particular question, examining a 
broader region (the entire United States and Norway), and using a different source of 
6variation by focusing on changes in dropout ages rather than school entry ages. 
2.2 Institutional setting 
In addition to the fact the our identification strategy allows us to use large and 
representative data sets, another advantage of our study is that we can compare the effect 
of changes in compulsory schooling laws on teenage fertility choice across two countries. 
Norway and the United States are similar in that both have very high GDP per capita and 
education levels, but differ in terms of institutional environment; of particular importance 
are the welfare support systems for teenage mothers. 
The U.S. system of support for teenage mothers is considered to be relatively 
unsupportive when compared to many other industrialized countries.  Established under 
Title IV of the Social Security Act, Aid to Dependent Children was operated largely 
under state and local control (Baicker 2004).  Targeted primarily at the children (and not 
the parents), eligibility was often limited by ?suitable home? requirements (stating that 
benefits could only be given when eligible children resided in a suitable home), seasonal 
employment policies, and illegitimacy exclusions.  Although there is significant variation 
across states, there is a common belief that it is not a generous system relative to more 
socialized countries such as Norway. 
In contrast, since the early 1960s, the relevant time period for the compulsory 
schooling legislation change in Norway, the Norwegian welfare system has been very 
generous (Rønsen and Strøm, 1991). To enable single parents to take care of their 
children without working, the government provides income support via the social security 
system until the child is ten years of age (so long as the woman is not living with the 
7child?s father).3  The government also helps to enforce child support payments from the 
father.  In addition, the government pays all education expenses for the mother 
(reimbursement is only partial if the woman is working) and provides subsidized housing 
and child care4  Finally, single parents get double child allowances from the government.5
In summary, the Norwegian system of support for single mothers is very generous. 
 Access to contraception and abortion has changed in both countries in the past 40 
years.  Although the birth control pill was approved in 1960 by the Food and Drug 
Administration and spread rapidly among married women, it wasn?t until the late 1960s 
that it diffused among single women (with a series of changes in state legislation 
reducing the age of majority and extending mature minor decisions.  See Goldin and Katz 
(2002) for more details.) Thus, the pill influenced behavior during the teenage years of 
only the youngest cohorts in our U.S. sample. In Norway, the birth control pill was 
introduced in the late 1960s and spread quite quickly and so was available during the 
teenage years of some of the later cohorts in the sample we study (Noack and Ostby, 
1981).6
Abortion was not legalized in Norway until 1979. In the U.S., abortion was 
legalized in 1973 through the landmark Roe vs. Wade Supreme Court decision.7  As a 
result, almost none of the women in either our Norwegian or U.S. sample had access to 
legal abortion during their teenage years.   
3 This system was introduced in 1964 and became a part of the social security system in 1971. 
4 In 1990 the income support system was made less generous in order to provide incentives for work; 
however, this is not relevant to the cohorts we study. 
5 All parents get a child allowance in Norway (about 1000 NOK per year). 
6 Interestingly, we have examined the effects of the compulsory schooling legislation on earlier cohorts 
only and find similar effects, suggesting that this changing environment has no significant impact on our 
results. 
7 Abortion was legal in New York, California, Washington, Hawaii, and Arkansas beginning in 1970.  See 
Levine (2004a, 2004b) for more details. 
83.  The Compulsory Schooling Laws
(a) Changes in U.S. Compulsory Schooling Laws 
 Since the history of compulsory schooling laws in the U.S. is by now well 
documented (see, in particular, Lleras-Muney 2001, and Goldin and Katz 2003), we will 
not describe them in great detail here.  Essentially, there were five possible restrictions on 
educational attendance:  1. maximum age by which a child must be enrolled, 2. minimum 
age at which a child may drop out, 3. minimum years of schooling before dropping out, 4. 
minimum age for a work permit, and 5. minimum schooling required for a work permit.  
In the years relevant to our sample, 1924 to 1974, states changed compulsory attendance 
laws many times, usually upwards but sometimes downwards.  Appendix Table 1 shows 
the minimum dropout age by states over time.  Although there is variation, there is also 
substantial persistence, highlighting the importance of adjusting standard errors for 
clustering at the state level.  Papers on the topic have used a variety of combinations of 
these restrictions as their measures of compulsory schooling. To be consistent with the 
source of variation in our Norwegian data, our baseline specification will examine the 
effect of the minimum dropout age on teenage pregnancy.  As a specification check, we 
will also examine the sensitivity of our results to the use of required years of schooling, 
defined as the difference between the minimum dropout age and the maximum 
enrollment age following Lleras-Muney and Goldin and Katz, as well as to the inclusion 
of the minimum age for a work permit.  We follow Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and 
Lochner and Moretti (2004) in assigning compulsory attendance laws to women on the 
basis of state of birth and the year when the individual was 14 years old (with the 
9exception that the enrollment age is assigned based on the laws in place when the 
individual was 7 years old). 
 Lleras-Muney (2001) thoroughly investigates the relationship between changes in 
compulsory schooling laws and other state-level variables. She finds no evidence that the 
relationship between the laws and education is related to manufacturing wages, 
manufacturing employment, expenditures on education, or demographic characteristics of 
the population. In the robustness checks in Section 6, we carry out several checks that 
suggest that the relationship between compulsory schooling laws and early fertility is not 
spurious.
(b) The Norwegian Primary School Reform 
In 1959, the Norwegian Parliament legislated a mandatory school reform that 
increased the minimum level of education in society by extending the number of 
compulsory years of education from 7 to 9 years (thereby increasing the minimum 
dropout age from 14 to 16, as students started at age 7).  Prior to the reform, children 
started school at the age of seven and finished compulsory education after seven years, 
i.e. at the age of fourteen.  In the new system, the starting age was still seven years old, 
but the time spent in compulsory education was now nine years.   In addition, the reform 
standardized the curriculum and increased access to schools, since 9 years of mandatory 
school was eventually made available in all municipalities. 
The parliament mandated that all municipalities (the lowest level of local 
administration) must have implemented the reform by 1973; as a result, although it was 
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started in 1960, implementation was not completed until 1972.8 This suggests that, for 
more than a decade, Norwegian schools were divided into two separate systems; which 
system you were in depended on the year you were born and the municipality in which 
you lived. The first cohort that could have been involved in the refo rm was the one born 
in 1947. They started school in 1954, and either (i) finished the pre-reform compulsory 
school in 1961, or (ii) went to primary school from 1954 to 1960, followed by the post-
reform middle school from 1960 to 1963. The last cohort who could have gone through 
the old system was born in 1958. This cohort started school in 1965 and finished 
compulsory school in 1972.9  Early work by Lie (1973, 1974) suggests that the timing of 
the implementation was unrelated to municipality characteristics such as industrial 
structure and size.  We present a more rigorous discussion of the education reform and 
the determinants of the timing of implementation in the Appendix. 
4. Empirical Methodology: Probability of Having First Birth as a Teenager 
In both the U.S. and Norway, there is time-series as well as cross-sectional 
variation in the number of years of compulsory schooling required of individuals during 
the periods studied. 
U.S. Model:
The empirical model for the United States is as follows:   
8 The reform had already started on a small and explorative basis in the late 1950s, but applied to a 
negligible number of students because only a few small municipalities, each with a small number of 
schools, were involved. See Lie (1974), Telhaug (1969), and Lindbekk (1992), for descriptions of the 
reform. 
9 Similar school reforms were undertaken in many other European countries in the same period, notably 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and, to some extent, France and Germany (Leschinsky and Mayer, 1990).
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WHITESTATECOHORTCOMPULSORYTEENBIRTH 43210 (1)
where COHORT refers to a full set of year of birth indicators, STATE refers to a full set 
of state indicators, and WHITE is a dummy indicator for whether the woman is white. 
For the U.S., COMPULSORY is a vector of three dummy variables describing the 
minimum dropout age in a state, with a minimum dropout age of less than 16 as the 
omitted category. Because TEENBIRTH is a binary indicator for whether the woman had 
her first birth as a teenager, we estimate the model using maximum likelihood probit. 
It is important to note that we are including both cohort and state effects. The 
cohort effects are necessary to allow for secular changes in educational attainment over 
time that may be completely unrelated to compulsory schooling laws. The state effects 
allow for the fact that variation in the timing of the law changes across states may not 
have been exogenous to fertility decisions. Even if the reform was implemented first in 
areas with certain unobserved characteristics, consistent estimation is still achieved so 
long as (a) these characteristics are fixed over time or (b) implementation of law changes 
is not correlated with changes in these characteristics or (c) these characteristics are not 
related to the probability of having a teen birth. 
Norway Model:
We use a similar specification for the Norwegian data, replacing the state 
dummies with municipality dummies.  The specification is as follows: 
TYMUNICIPALICOHORTCOMPULSORYTEENBIRTH 3210 (2)
For Norway, COMPULSORY equals 1 if the individual was affected by the education 
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reform (minimum dropout age of 16), and 0 otherwise (minimum dropout age of 14).10
Again, cohort effects are quite important since the income support system for single 
mothers changed somewhat over time and we want to compare the effect of the 
compulsory schooling laws on teenage fertility within cohorts. 
5. Data
(a) United States 
We use the IPUMS extracts from the decennial Census from 1940 to 1980. The 
particular samples we use are the 1% 1940 sample, the 1% 1950 sample, the 1% 1960 
sample, the two 1% 1970 state samples, and the 5% 1980 samples. Analysis using the 
Census is complicated by the fact that children are only observed if they are living in the 
household with their mother. It is possible to link mothers to their children in these data 
and use the age of the eldest own child in the household to determine the age at which the 
mother first gave birth. We omit women from the sample if their first birth occurred 
before age 15. Since children tend to start leaving home about age 16, this implies that we 
can only get an accurate count on teenage births for the sample of women aged no more 
than about 31 (15+16). Thus, we restrict our Census sample to women aged between 20 
and 30. 
 For most of our sample (1960-1980), the data include quarter of birth and we use 
this variable to determine the woman's age at first birth to within 3 months. For the 1940 
and 1950 samples, we do not observe quarter of birth and so age at first birth is known to 
within a year. As is standard in the literature, we assign the compulsory schooling law 
indicators on the basis of state of birth rather than state of residence. We do so because 
10 Note that we do not include race dummies for Norway as there is very little variation in race in Norway 
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mobility across states may be influenced by educational attainment and hence by the 
compulsory schooling laws.  Random mobility at any point after birth may imply that an 
individual is not actually impacted by the laws that we think they are; this creates a 
measurement error problem that will tend to bias our estimates of the effects of the laws 
towards zero. 
(b) Norway 
Based on different administrative registers and census data from Statistics 
Norway, a comprehensive data set has been compiled of the entire population in Norway, 
including information on family background, age, marital status, educational history, 
neighborhood information, and employment information.11  Note that, unlike with the 
U.S. data, we are able to observe all children and not just those living in the household.
The initial database is linked administrative data that covers the entire population 
of Norwegians aged 16-74.  These administrative data provide information about 
educational attainment, labor market status and a set of demographic variables (age, 
gender).
To determine whether women were affected by the compulsory schooling 
legislation, we need to link each woman to the municipality in which she grew up. We do 
this by matching the administrative data to the 1960 census. From the 1960 census, we 
know the municipality in which the woman's mother lived in 1960.12  In 1960, the women 
during this period. 
11 See Møen, Salvanes and Sørensen (2003) for a description of the data set. 
12 Since very few children live with their father in the cases where parents are not living together, we 
should only have minimal misclassification by applying this rule. 
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we are using in the estimation are aged between 2 and 13.13    As in the U.S. case, random 
mobility at any point after we assign location may imply that an individual is not actually 
impacted by the reform although we think they are. This creates a measurement error 
problem that will tend to bias our estimates of the effects of the reform towards zero.  
Our primary data source on the timing of the reform in individual municipalities 
is the volume by Ness (1971).  To verify the dates provided by Ness, we examined the 
data to determine whether or not there appears to be a clear break in the fraction of 
students with less than 9 years of education. In the rare instance when the data did not 
seem consistent with the timing stated in Ness, we checked these individual 
municipalities by contacting local sources.  We are able to successfully calculate reform 
indicators for 545 out of the 728 municipalities in existence in 1960.  If the reform took 
more than one year to implement in a particular municipality or we were not able to 
verify the information given in Ness (1971), we could not assign a reform indicator to 
that municipality.  However, we have reform information for a large majority of 
individuals in the relevant cohorts.
We include cohorts of women born between 1947 and 1958 in our sample. For 
these women, we observe their children in 2000. From the year and month of birth of the 
children and the year and month of birth of the mother, we can determine the age of the 
mother at her first birth to the nearest month. We exclude from our sample the small 
number of women who have a first birth before age 15 and we define a teenage birth as 
one occurring when the mother has not yet reached her 20th birthday at the birth of her 
13 One concern is that there may be selective migration into or out of municipalities that implement the 
reform early.  However, since the reform implementation did not occur before 1960, reform-induced 
mobility should not be a problem for us. Evidence from Meghir and Palme (2003) on Sweden and Telhaug 
(1969) on Norway suggest that reform-induced migration was not a significant consideration.
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first child. 
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the women in our sample. First consider 
the U.S. data. About 4 percent of women in the sample faced a dropout age of less than 
16, 75 percent had a minimum dropout age of 16, 12 percent had a dropout age of 17 and 
9 percent had a minimum dropout age of 18. Also, we see that 17 percent of women have 
their first birth as a teenager.  
In the Norwegian data, we see that 52 percent of women are affected by the 
reform. Similar to the U.S., 17 percent of women have their first birth as a teenager. 
Effect of Laws on Educational Attainment
To provide some background, we assess the impact of the compulsory schooling 
laws on educational attainment by regressing completed education on the laws and on the 
cohort dummies and state dummies (for the U.S.) and municipality dummies (for 
Norway).14 The results are presented in Appendix Table 2. 
Consistent with our earlier work on Norway (See Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 
2003), we estimate a coefficient on the reform of 0.122 (0.022) indicating that, on 
average, education increased by 0.12 of a year as a result of the law change. In the U.S., 
the coefficient on Dropout Age=16 is 0.404, suggesting that the educational impact of a 
similar change in the U.S. is bigger than that in Norway (however, the U.S. estimate is 
quite imprecise and is statistically insignificant). 
14 We restrict our U.S. sample to women aged between 22 and 30 in order to reduce the problem of 
16
Readers may find it surprising that we find no statistically significant relationship 
between U.S. compulsory schooling laws and educational attainment. Many previous 
studies have used these laws as instruments for education and reported very strong first 
stage relationships (for example, Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Lleras-Muney, 2002). This 
discrepancy appears to arise because we cluster our standard errors at the state level while 
these other papers cluster at the state-year level.15 In the third column of the table, we 
report estimates when we cluster at the state-year level and the standard errors are about 
four times lower. This probably reflects the long time-series component to our state year 
panel and the presence of serial correlation (see Bert rand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 
2004).
6.  Results for the Probit Models 
The probit marginal effects of compulsory schooling on teenage childbearing 
(equation 1) are presented in Table 2.16 The marginal effects for the U.S. are in the top 
panel. These numbers reflect the effect of the minimum dropout age specified by the 
compulsory schooling law on the probability of having the first birth before each age. To 
assess the magnitude of the coefficients, it is important to know the probabilities of births 
during these years: The percentage of women have their first birth before 17 is 2%, 
before 18 is 6%, before 19 is 11%, before 20 is 17%, and before 21 is 24% (See Table 1). 
We find no evidence that the small probability of having a first birth before age 17 is 
influenced by the laws. However, the results in the other 4 columns suggest that the laws 
censored educational attainment. 
15 Goldin and Katz (2003) also cluster at the state level and they find marginally significant effects of the 
laws on educational attainment during the early part of the 20th century. 
16 In all the probit models, we report robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the state level in the 
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have a significantly negative effect on the probability of having a first child before ages 
18 to 21. The magnitude of the effects is also quite large. The coefficient of -0.008 on 
Dropout Age=16 in the fourth column implies that the effect of compelling women to 
stay in school until 16 is to reduce the probability of a teen birth by 4.7% 
((0.008*100)/0.17). The effect of imposing a law mandating women to stay in school 
until 17 is to reduce the probability of a teen birth by 8.8% ((0.015*100)/0.17). In 
contrast, we do not find any significant effect of having a minimum dropout age of 18. 
However, the standard errors are very high for this variable. 
The proportion of first births by age in our Norwegian sample is as follows: 1% 
before age 17, 4% before age 18, 9% before age 19, 17% before age 20, and 25% before 
age 21 (See Table 1). The probit marginal effects for Norway are in the second panel of 
Table 2. Note that the effect of the reform was to increase the minimum dropout age from 
14 to 16 in Norway. Once again, there is evidence that the compulsory schooling law 
reduced the likelihood of births during the teenage years. The marginal effects imply that 
the implementation of the reform reduced the probability of a first birth as a teenage by 
about 3.5% ((0.006*100)/0.17). This is similar but somewhat smaller than the 4.7% effect 
of Dropout Age=16 in the United States. Generally, the effects of the reform in Norway 
are very similar to those of Dropout Age=16 in the United States. 
To better understand our results, we stratify our sample based on the urban/rural 
status of the individuals. One might expect enforcement to be easier in urban areas and 
hence the laws may have a larger impact.  While we can get a precise breakdown of the 
urban/rural status in our Norwegian data using the metropolitan status of the individuals 
from the 1960 census, it is more difficult for the U.S. data.  As a proxy for the urban/rural 
United States and the municipality level in Norway. 
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status in the United States, we are forced to use the status at the time of the Census, when 
women are aged between 20 and 30.  Given that there is significant mobility, we view 
this as a rough proxy for the actual urban/rural status of the individual when she was in 
school.17
 As one might have predicted, the results, presented in Table 3, appear to be 
stronger for the urban sample. This is particularly true for Norway, where the effects are 
much larger for the urban sample. While the rural results are roughly consistent, they are 
never statistically significant.  We also tried stratifying our U.S. sample based on the race 
of the individual; when we do this, it becomes clear that the compulsory schooling laws 
had a more significant effect on teenage childbearing among whites.  The results for 
blacks were never statistically significant.  This is consistent with the work of Goldin and 
Katz (2003) who find smaller effects of compulsory schooling laws on educational 
attainment for blacks than whites. 
Robustness/Specification Checks 
 We have carried out numerous specification checks to verify our findings.  They 
are as follows. 
Inclusion of State-Year Trends
 Because we are identifying off of variation in compulsory schooling across states 
over time, it is not possible to include state by time dummies.  However, we can allow for 
state-specific trends (in the Norwegian case, municipality-specific trends).  When we 
include these trends (Table 4), we get estimates that are quite similar to those in Table 
17 In the U.S., we define urban as being resident in a metropolitan area. In Norway, individuals are 
classified as urban if their mother lived in one of the main cities and towns in 1960. 
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2.18
Alternative Weighting Schemes
 When using the U.S. Census data, we are able to get 1% samples from 1940, 
1950, and 1960, a 2% sample from 1970, and a 5% sample from the 1980 data.  As a 
result, we are giving more weight to the most recent cohorts.  If there is no difference in 
the effect of compulsory schooling laws on teenage childbearing over time, the results 
should be the same whether we weight each cohort equally or not.  This, however, is 
testable.  In Table 5, we present the results when we weight each cohort equally (thereby 
weighting each observation by the inverse of the number of individuals in that cohort in 
our sample). While the results are consistent with those in Table 2, it does seem that, 
when more weight is placed on the earlier periods, the more stringent compulsory 
schooling laws are more effective. 
Effect of Future Laws on Current Fertility
 Future law changes should have no impact on current fertility behavior. If they 
do, it would suggest that something other than changes in compulsory schooling may be 
driving our results.  To check this, we have calculated the minimum dropout ages that 
exist 10 years into the future, and have added these to the specification. The estimates are 
in Table 6.19 Although we see that there are three instances where the future laws have a 
statistically significant effect on fertility behavior (one negative effect, and two positive 
effects), the addition of the future laws does not change the effects of the actual laws. If 
anything, the results are strengthened by the addition of the future laws, suggesting that 
18We have also tried adding state of residence fixed effects and Census year fixed effects in the U.S. 
sample and these have had little effect on the estimates. 
19 The sample size is smaller in Table 5 because the compulsory schooling law file finishes in 1978 and so 
we cannot calculate the dropout ages ten years into the future for cohorts born after 1964. 
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the change in fertility we observe is in fact caused by the change in compulsory schooling 
laws.
Alternative Measures of Compulsory Schooling
While we have used the minimum dropout age as our indicator for compulsory 
schooling in the U.S., other work has used a variety of measures, and we test the 
sensitivity of our results to this choice. To do so, we apply the same estimation strategy 
but use the required number of years of schooling (defined as the minimum dropout age 
minus the maximum enrollment age 7 years prior) as our measure of compulsory 
education instead. We split the years of compulsory schooling into 4 categories ? less 
than 9, 9, 10, and 11 or more. We exclude the less than 9 category from the specification. 
Table 7 presents these results. Consistent with our earlier findings, the estimates show 
that the probability of early childbearing is negatively affected by the number of years of 
compulsory education. As we would expect, there is a general pattern that the more strict 
the law, the greater the impact on teen childbearing. The results for years of compulsory 
schooling are robust to all the specification checks discussed above. 
 In Table 8, we report estimates where we use the minimum age at which an 
individual could get a work permit as our measure of compulsory schooling. We include 
two dummy variables ? one for whether the dropout age was 15, and the other for 
whether the age was greater than 15. The omitted category is a dropout age of less than 
15. We find that the presence of a dropout age of 15 has a statistically significant 
negative effect on early fertility. Overall, we find that changes in compulsory schooling 
laws impact fertility, irrespective of how they are defined.20
20 Recent work by Goldin and Katz (2003) suggests that child labor laws may be more significant than the 
compulsory schooling laws in terms of affecting school attendance.  However, in our sample, this is not the 
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7. Why Do Compulsory Schooling Laws affect Timing of Births? 
Given that we find an effect of compulsory schooling laws on teenage fertility, the 
next step it to try to uncover mechanisms through which this relationship is working.  
Consider a static model of schooling and fertility decisions. At the beginning of 
their teenage years, young women choose their schooling level and their fertility 
behavior.  In the absence of institutional constraints, these decisions are made optimally 
and depend on the utility function of each individual as well as her ability. If, however, a 
compulsory schooling law is in place, this constrains the educational choice of some 
women and leads them to choose greater education than would have been chosen 
otherwise.  In turn, this new optimal educational level may be associated with a new set 
of fertility choices.21
In particular, because it is likely to be quite costly to be in school as a young 
mother, an exogenous increase in education of the individual may be associated with a 
postponement of fertility.  We call this the ?incarceration effect?; while women are in 
school, they do not have the desire/time/opportunity to have a child.22
In addition, since more education increases human capital, this is also a 
mechanism through which increases in education may lead to postponed fertility.23  We 
case; among women in our sample, the compulsory schooling laws were as effective as the child labor laws 
in influencing fertility. 
21 It is important to note that this ?rational choice? approach assumes women make optimal decisions on 
timing of births taking into account all the costs and benefits involved.  This is often discussed in 
conjunction with an alternative approach that sees many teenage pregnancies as "mistakes" resulting from 
thoughtless behavior, lack of knowledge about the long run consequences, or lack of knowledge about birth 
control. It is this view that fertility behavior may not be optimal that underscores much of the policy 
interest in this topic. 
22 Jacob and Lefgren (2003) discuss the ?incarceration effect? in the context of the effects of education on 
teenage criminal behavior. 
23 Happel et al. (1984) model the timing of children and argue that, if capital markets are perfect, the timing 
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call the fact that the additional schooling may make you ?smarter? and hence decide to 
postpone childbearing the ?current human capital effect?, and we call the fact that 
expectations about the future acquisition of human capital are changed by compulsory 
schooling laws and this may change fertility decisions the ?future human capital effect.?
 If the effects of the compulsory schooling laws occur solely due to the 
"incarceration" effect, then the laws should have no impact on behavior at ages above 
which the laws induce schooling.  To examine this, we estimate probit models of the 
probability of having a first birth at age x, conditional on having no birth prior to that. We 
estimate this model for x equal to 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20. If the laws impact the 
probability of first birth at ages above which they bind, then this is strong evidence that 
the "incarceration" effect is not the only effect. 
 Table 9 presents the probit estimates of the probability of a birth at a particular 
age conditional on no prior birth. Given that women are pregnant for about 9 months, the 
"incarceration" model implies that the Dropout Age=16 should impact births at age 16 
and 17, but should have little impact on births at higher ages.24 However we find that 
Dropout Age=16 has a small and statistically insignificant effect on the probability of 
first birth at age 16, but has a statistically significant negative effect on births at ages 17 
and 18. Likewise, although Dropout Age=17 does have a negative effect at age 17, it has, 
if anything, larger negative effects at ages 18 and 19. In the Norwegian data, the reform 
raised the minimum school leaving age from 14 to 16 for most people. Despite this, there 
of first child depends on the rate at which earnings depreciate due to absence from the labor market, and the 
initial level of earnings at the start of the woman's life cycle. If women start with very low earning power, 
and skills depreciate with absence from the market, then it is optimal to have children early. On the other 
hand, if initial earnings are high, postponing childbirth is optimal. Thus, in this framework, women with 
more human capital are more likely to postpone childbirth.  
24 If people do actually drop out of school on their 16th birthday, this compulsory schooling law should 
only impact births at age 16 through the ?incarceration? effect. 
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is a negative effect of the reform on the probability of giving birth at age 18 (although 
this is statistically insignificant), which is too old for the "incarceration" effect to be 
relevant. Thus, the evidence for the "incarceration" effect of compulsory schooling laws 
is very weak in this probit analysis and suggests that the human capital effects are likely 
playing a role. We can be certain that whether or not there is an "incarceration" effect, 
there are also other mechanisms that influence fertility behavior.25  Unfortunately, the 
nature of our data prohibits us from distinguishing much beyond this point. 
8. Conclusions 
Many studies find that early fertility adversely affects women?s economic 
outcomes such as the level of completed schooling, labor market participation, and 
wages.  However, there is limited information about policy relevant factors that might be 
important determinants of early fertility decisions. This paper has attempted to increase 
our knowledge by studying the role of compulsory schooling laws. 
  We find that minimum school requirements have a significantly negative effect on 
the probability of having a child as a teenager both in the United States and in Norway. 
Our results are robust to a number of specification checks. It is noteworthy that our 
estimates are fairly similar in two countries ? the U.S. and Norway ? that are so different 
institutionally. These findings suggests that policy interventions to increase female 
education at the lower tail of the educational distribution may be an effective means of 
25 In Appendix Table 4, we present the equivalent estimates for the U.S. where each cohort is weighted 
equally. Once again, there is evidence against a pure incarceration effect as Dropout Age=17 affects 
fertility behavior at 19 and 20, and Dropout Age=18 affects behavior at age 20. There is also a shred of 
evidence for the ?future human capital effect? in that Dropout Age=18 has a statistically significant 
negative effect on the probability of a birth at age 17. That is, women who know that they will have to stay 
in school until age 18 are less likely to have a child at age 17 than other women with the same amount of 
schooling who do not face this future compulsory schooling.  
24
reducing rates of teenage childbearing, regardless of the welfare structure in place. 
In addition to studying the effects of compulsory schooling laws on teenage 
fertility choice, we also examine different mechanisms through which the compulsory 
schooling legislation may be affecting fertility behavior. The first mechanism we 
consider is an ?incarceration? effect or the fact that educational attendance reduces time 
available to engage in risky behavior. Alternative mechanisms are related to human 
capital theory where both current and expected human capital may impact teenage 
fertility choice. Our results suggest that the effect of compulsory schooling laws goes 
beyond a pure ?incarceration? effect. 
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Appendix:  The Norwegian Education Reform
To receive funds from the government to implement the reform, municipalities 
had to present a plan to a committee under the Ministry of Education.  Once approved, 
the costs of teachers and buildings were provided by the national government.  While the 
criteria determining selection by the committee are somewhat unclear, the committee did 
want to ensure that implementation was representative of the country, conditional on 
having an acceptable plan. (Telhaug, 1969, Mediås, 2000).  Appendix Figure 1 presents 
the spread of the reform over time, focusing on the number of municipalities 
implementing the reform per year.   
While it is not necessary for our estimation strategy, it would be useful if the 
timing of the implementation of the reform across municipalities were uncorrelated with 
general educational levels. One might worry that poorer municipalities would be among 
the first to implement the reform, given the substantial state subsidies, while wealthier 
municipalities would move much slower.  However, work examining the determinants of 
the timing of implementation finds no relationship between municipality characteristics 
such as average earnings, taxable income, and educational levels, and the timing of 
implementation.  (See Lie 1973, 1974.)  Municipalities that are located geographically 
near municipalities that already implemented the reform were themselves more likely to 
implement the reform; numerous interviews revealed that this was likely due to a 
particularly effective county administrator.  As a result, the research supports a complex 
adoption process without finding support for a single important factor to explain the 
implementation process.   To examine this ourselves, Appendix Figures 2, 3, and 4 
examine the implementation of the reform by the average income, parental education, and 
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size of the municipalities; these figures suggest that there is little relationship between 
these factors and the timing of the implementation of the reform. 
 As a more rigorous test, in Appendix Table 3 we regress the year of 
implementation on different background variables based on municipality averages, 
including parental income, the level of education, average age, and the size of the 
municipality, as well as county dummies (there are 20 counties in Norway). Consistent 
with the existing literature, there appears to be no systematic relationship between the 
timing of implementation and parent average earnings, education levels, average age, 
urban/rural status, industry or labor force composition, municipality unemployment rates 
in 1960, and the share of individuals who were members of the Labor party (the most 
pro-reform and dominant political party). 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
United States 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   
Birth Cohort 1948.14 12.34 1910.00 1960.00 
Age at Census 24.80 3.16 20.00 30.00 
Education 12.30 2.52 0.00 17.00 
White 0.86 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Child before 17 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Child before 18 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Child before 19 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Child as teenager 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Child before 21 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Dropout Age is <16 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Dropout Age is 16 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Dropout Age is 17 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Dropout age is 18 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Enrolment Age is 6 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Enrolment Age is 7 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Enrolment Age is 8+ 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
N=1,584,094
Norway 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Birth Cohort 1953 3.35 1947 1958 
Age in 2000 47.01 3.35 42.00 53.00 
Education 11.50 2.58 5.00 21.00 
Child before 17 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Child before 18 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Child before 19 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Child as teenager 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Child before 21 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Reform Implemented 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
N=260,641
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Table 2:   Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on the Probability of First Birth by 
A Certain Age:  Probit Marginal Effects 
United States
Dependent
Variable:
Birth by Age 
16
Birth by Age 
17
Birth by Age 
18
Birth by Age 
19
Birth by Age 
20
      
Dropout Age=16 -.00002 
(.0009)
-.0025
(.0017)
-.0058*
(.0018)
-.0077*
(.0024)
-.0095*
(.0047)
      
Dropout Age=17 -.0008 
(.0011)
-.0053*
(.0022)
-.0106*
(.0027)
-.0147*
(.0031)
-.0186*
(.0050)
      
Dropout Age=18 .0012 
(.0014)
-.0004
(.0060)
-.0004
(.0128)
-.0023
(.0147)
-.0085
(.0153)
      
White -.0421* 
(.0029)
-.0749*
(.0053)
-.1035*
(.0077)
-.1222*
(.0094)
-.1275*
(.0106)
N=1,584,094      
Norway  
Dependent
Variable:
Birth by 
Age 16 
Birth by 
Age 17 
Birth by 
Age 18 
Birth by 
Age 19 
Birth by
Age 20 
      
Reform -0.0006 
(0.0006)
-0.0020
(0.0015)
-0.0047*
(0.0024)
-0.0063
(0.0037)
-0.0087*
(0.0043)
N=260,641      
Estimates are marginal effects from probit maximum likelihood. Each column denotes a separate 
regression.  Also included in the specifications are year-of-birth indicators. The U.S. specifications also 
include state dummies; the Norway specifications include municipality indicators.  Standard errors are all 
adjusted for clustering at the state/municipality level. 
* denotes statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Table 3:   Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on the Probability of Birth:  
Urban/Rural Distinction 
United States 
 Birth by  
Age 16 
Birth By 
Age 17 
Birth By 
Age 18 
Birth by
Age 19 
Birth by
Age 20 
Urban
N=1,063,181
Dropout Age=16 .0007 
(.0009)
-.0016
(.0017)
-.0019
(.0030)
-.0031
(.0055)
-.0030
(.0089)
Dropout Age=17 -.0003 
(.0012)
-.0057*
(.0018)
-.0100*
(.0029)
-.0146*
(.0052)
-.0163
(.0087)
Dropout Age=18 .0028 
(.0024)
.0025
(.0084)
.0068
(.0173)
.0012
(.0071)
-.0033
(.0182)
White -.0448* 
(.0034)
-.0818*
(.0064)
-.1166*
(.0093)
-.1425*
(.0114)
-.1556*
(.0127)
      
Rural
N=520,913
Dropout Age=16 .0008 
(.0016)
-.0002
(.0033)
-.0039
(.0034)
-.0029
(.0037)
-.0031
(.0064)
Dropout Age=17 -.0007 
(.0020)
-.0033
(.0038)
-.0066
(.0047)
-.0003
(.0053)
-.0097
(.0084)
Dropout Age=18 .0007 
(.0032)
-.0004
(.0040)
-.0020
(.0053)
.0089
(.0095)
.0061
(.0115)
White -.0376 
(.0017)
-.0643
(.0028)
-.0830
(.0041)
-.0924
(.0051)
-.0862
(.0054)
      
Norway 
 Birth by  
Age 16 
Birth By 
Age 17 
Birth By 
Age 18 
Birth by
Age 19 
Birth by
Age 20 
Urban
N=87,752
     
Reform -.0010
(.0010)
-.0053*
(.0026)
-.0094*
(.0038)
-.0212*
(.0067)
-.0275*
(.0089)
Rural
N=172,889
     
Reform -.0003
(.0008)
-.0005
(.0016)
-.0027
(.0028)
.0008
(.0035)
.0003
(.0041)
Estimates are marginal effects from probit maximum likelihood. Each column denotes a separate 
regression.  Also included in the specifications are year-of-birth indicators. The U.S. specifications also 
include state dummies; the Norway specifications include municipality indicators.  Standard errors are all 
adjusted for clustering at the state/municipality level. 
* denotes statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Table 4:  Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on the Probability of Birth 
Including State-Year Trends 
United States
Dependent
Variable:
Birth by Age 
16
Birth by Age 
17
Birth by Age 
18
Birth by Age 
19
Birth by Age 
20
      
Dropout Age=16 .0016* 
(.0006)
-.0003
(.0016)
-.0036
(.0031)
-.0086*
(.0040)
-.0151*
(.0060)
      
Dropout Age=17 .0008 
(.0011)
-.0032
(.0019)
-.0072
(.0037)
-.0131*
(.0046)
-.0233*
(.0072)
      
Dropout Age=18 .0042* 
(.0018)
.0020
(.0079)
.0003
(.0037)
-.0087
(.0177)
-.0175
(.0187)
      
White -.0417* 
(.0028)
-.0744*
(.0052)
-.1031*
(.0076)
-.1219*
(.0093)
-.1274*
(.0106)
N=1,584,094      
Norway  
Dependent
Variable:
Birth by 
Age 16 
Birth by 
Age 17 
Birth by 
Age 18 
Birth by 
Age 19 
Birth by
Age 20 
      
Reform -0.0002 
(0.0002)
-0.0015
(0.0015)
-0.0046*
(0.0021)
-0.0049
(0.0028)
-0.0063
(0.0034)
N=260,637      
Estimates are marginal effects from probit maximum likelihood. Each column denotes a separate 
regression.  Also included in the specifications are year-of-birth indicators. The U.S. specifications also 
include state dummies; the Norway specifications include municipality indicators.  Standard errors are all 
adjusted for clustering at the state/municipality level. 
* denotes statistically significant at the 5% level.
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 Table 5:  Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on the Probability of Birth:  Equal 
Weighting of Cohorts: Probit Ma rginal Effects, United States 
Dependent
Variable:
Birth by Age 
16
Birth by Age 
17
Birth by Age 
18
Birth by Age 
19
Birth by Age 
20
      
Dropout Age=16 .0001 
(.0009)
-.0008
(.0023)
-.0023
(.0033)
-.0051
(.0039)
-.0079*
(.0039)
      
Dropout Age=17 -.0017 
(.0012)
-.0051
(.0025)
-.0104*
(.0038)
-.0185*
(.0060)
-.0248*
(.0052)
      
Dropout Age=18 -.0004 
(.0012)
-.0099*
(.0039)
-.0202*
(.0088)
-.0294
(.0149)
-.0365*
(.0115)
      
White -.0354* 
(.0023)
-.0606*
(.0046)
-.0803*
(.0072)
-.0853*
(.0088)
-.0765*
(.0103)
N=1,584,094      
Estimates are marginal effects from probit maximum likelihood. Each column denotes a separate 
regression.  Also included in the specifications are year-of-birth indicators and state dummies.  Standard 
errors are all adjusted for clustering at the state/municipality level. 
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Table 6:   Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on the Probability of Birth 
Including Future Legislation:  Probit Marginal Effects, United States  
Dependent
Variable:
Birth by Age 
16
Birth by Age 
17
Birth by Age 
18
Birth by Age 
19
Birth by Age 
20
      
Dropout Age=16 0.0006
(0.0008)
-0.0024
(0.0018)
-0.0051*
(0.0020)
-0.0087*
(0.0025)
-0.0113*
(0.0051)
      
Dropout Age=17 -0.0002
(0.0008)
-0.0050*
(0.0016)
-0.0101*
(0.0019)
-0.0175*
(0.0027)
-0.0236*
(0.0051)
      
Dropout Age=18 0.0012
(0.0015)
-0.0076*
(0.0032)
-0.0174*
(0.0073)
-0.0215
(0.0148)
-0.0315*
(0.0133)
Future Laws      
Dropout Age=16 -0.0002
(0.0007)
0.0027
(0.0020)
0.0047
(0.0022)
0.0105*
(0.0039)
0.0127*
(0.0060)
      
Dropout Age=17 -0.0010
(0.0014)
0.0008
(0.0028)
-0.0010
(0.0030)
0.0013
(0.0050)
0.0042
(0.0072)
      
Dropout Age=18 -0.0041*
(0.0015)
0.0006
(0.0030)
-0.0004
(0.0035)
0.0052
(0.0054)
0.0073
(0.0072)
      
White -.0403* 
(.0030)
-.0728*
(.0057)
-.1013*
(.0085)
-.1170*
(.0102)
-.1181*
(.0113)
N=1,001,121      
Estimates are marginal effects from probit maximum likelihood. Each column denotes a separate 
regression.  Also included in the specifications are year-of-birth indicators and state dummies.  Standard 
errors are all adjusted for clustering at the state/municipality level.  * denotes statistically significant at the 
5% level. 
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Table 7:  Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on the Probability of Birth:  
Required Years of Schooling (Minimum Dropout Age-Maximum Enrollment 
Age), United States Data
Dependent
Variable:
Birth by Age 
16
Birth by Age 
17
Birth by Age 
18
Birth by Age 
19
Birth by Age 
20
      
9 Years of 
Schooling
-.0006
(.0010)
-.0044*
(.0016)
-.0085*
(.0019)
-.0122*
(.0025)
-.0140*
(.0032)
      
10 Years of 
Schooling
-.0006
(.0011)
-.0047*
(.0023)
-.0089*
(.0035)
-.0114*
(.0047)
-.0167*
(.0046)
      
11+ Years of 
Schooling
-.0020
(.0024)
-.0054
(.0054)
-.0073
(.0103)
-.0148
(.0123)
-.0174
(.0137)
      
White -.0421* 
(.0029)
-.0748*
(.0053)
-.1034*
(.0077)
-.1222*
(.0094)
-.1275*
(.0106)
N=1,584,094      
Estimates are marginal effects from probit maximum likelihood. Each column denotes a separate 
regression.  Also included in the specifications are year-of-birth indicators and state dummies.  Standard 
errors are all adjusted for clustering at the state/municipality level. 
Table 8:  Effect of Child Labor Laws on the Probability of Birth, United States Data 
Dependent
Variable:
Birth by Age 
16
Birth by Age 
17
Birth by Age 
18
Birth by Age 
19
Birth by Age 
20
      
Dropout Age=15 -.0007 
(.0006)
-.0044*
(.0010)
-.0100*
(.0012)
-.0136*
(.0022)
-.0096
(.0057)
      
Dropout Age>15 -.0006 
(.0013)
-.0016
(.0026)
-.0015
(.0039)
.0011
(.0052)
-.0016
(.0054)
      
White -.0420* 
(.0029)
-.0749*
(.0053)
-.0103
(.0077)
-.1222*
(.0094)
-.1276*
(.0106)
N=1,584,094      
Estimates are marginal effects from probit maximum likelihood. Each column denotes a separate 
regression. Also included in the specifications are year-of-birth indicators and state dummies. Standard 
errors are all adjusted for clustering at the state level. 
* denotes statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Table 9:  Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on the Probability of Birth 
Conditional on Not Already Having a Child 
United States
Dependent
Variable
Birth at 
16/No prior 
birth
Birth at 
17/No prior 
birth
Birth at 
18/No prior 
birth
Birth at 
19/No prior 
birth
Birth at 
20/No prior 
birth
      
Dropout Age=16 -.0001 
(.0006)
-.0025*
(.0009)
-.0035*
(.0013)
-.0021
(.0019)
-.0024
(.0036)
      
Dropout Age=17 -.0009 
(.0008)
-.0045*
(.0012)
-.0057*
(.0013)
-.0047*
(.0018)
-.0056
(.0040)
      
Dropout Age=18 .0002 
(.0010)
-.0015
(.0049)
.0005
(.0078)
-.0007
(.0054)
-.0061
(.0050)
      
White -.0271* 
(.0020)
-.0349*
(.0029)
-.0344*
(.0034)
-.0292*
(.0033)
-.0182*
(.0033)
      
N 1,572,513 1,545,369 1,493,288 1,414,844 1,311,693 
Norway  
Dependent
Variable:
Birth at 16/No 
prior birth 
Birth at 17/No 
prior birth 
Birth at 18/No 
prior birth 
Birth at 19/No 
prior birth 
Birth at 20/No 
prior birth 
      
Reform -0.0006 
(0.0006)
-0.0014
(0.0012)
-0.0029
(0.0017)
-0.0022
(0.0025)
-0.0032
(0.0025)
      
N 260,637 256,869 251,249 236,876 217,128 
Estimates are marginal effects from ordered probit estimation. Each column denotes a separate regression.  
The sample includes women between 20 and 30 years of age. Also included in the specifications are year-
of-birth indicators. The U.S. specifications also include state dummies; the Norway specifications include 
municipality indicators.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state/municipality level. 
* denotes statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Appendix Figure 1 
The Number of Municipalities Implementing the Education Reform, by Year 
Norway 
Reform implementation, year/municipalities
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Appendix Figure 2 
Reform implementation in Poor vs Rich Municipalities 
Based on Average Family Income, Norway. 
Reform implementation, by average family income
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Poor (rich) municipality is calculated as below (above) median parent?s 
income by municipality Parent?s average income is calculated for each 
municipality in 1970. 
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Appendix Figure 3
Reform Implementation in High vs. Low Education Municipalities 
Based on Average Years Father?s of Education in the Municipality, Norway 
Reform implementation, by average level of education
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Low (high) education municipality is calculated as below (above) median 
education by municipality. Father?s  average years of education is 
calculated for each municipality in 1960. 
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Appendix Figure 4 
Reform Implementation in Small vs. Large Municipalities, Norway 
Small (large) municipality is defined as below (above) median municipality as measured 
by population size in 1960.
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 Appendix Table 1:  Minimum Dropout Ages for the United States by State 
 Dropout Age: 
1924 
Dropout Age: 
1934 
Dropout Age: 
1944 
Dropout Age: 
1954 
Dropout Age: 
1964 
Dropout Age: 
1974 
Alabama 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Arizona 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Arkansas 15 16 16 16 16 16 
California 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Colorado 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Connecticut 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Delaware 16 16 16 16 16 16 
District of Columbia 14 16 16 16 16 16 
Florida 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Georgia 14 14 14 16 16 16 
Idaho 18 18 16 16 16 16 
Illinois 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Indiana 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Iowa 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Kansas 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Kentucky 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Louisiana 14 14 14 16 16 16 
Maine 17 17 14 16 16 16 
Maryland 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Massachusetts 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Michigan 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Minnesota 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Mississippi 14 17 16 16 0 0 
Missouri 16 16 14 16 16 16 
Montana 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Nebraska 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Nevada 18 18 18 18 17 17 
New Hampshire 16 16 16 16 16 16 
New Jersey 16 16 16 16 16 16 
New Mexico 16 16 16 17 17 17 
New York 16 16 16 16 16 16 
North Carolina 14 14 14 16 16 16 
North Dakota 17 17 17 17 16 16 
Ohio 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Oklahoma 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Oregon 16 18 16 18 18 18 
Pennsylvania 16 16 18 17 17 17 
Rhode Island 16 16 16 16 16 16 
South Carolina 14 14 16 16 0 16 
South Dakota 17 17 17 17 16 16 
Tennessee 16 16 16 16 16 17 
Texas 14 14 16 16 16 17 
Utah 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Vermont 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Virginia 14 15 15 16 16 17 
Washington 16 16 16 16 16 16 
West  Virginia 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Wisconsin 16 16 16 16 16 18 
Wyoming 16 17 17 16 17 17 
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Appendix Table 2:  Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on Educational 
Attainment
Dependent Variable:   Norway: Education 
Clustering at 
Municipality Level 
U.S.: Education 
Clustering at State 
Level
U.S.: Education 
Clustering at 
State-Year Level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dropout Age=16 .1218 
(.0217)
.4041
(.2520)
.4041*
(.0590)
    
Dropout Age=17  .4709 
(.2865)
.4709*
(.0696)
    
Dropout Age=18  .4245 
(.3045)
.4245*
(.0959)
    
White  .7298* 
(.0715)
.7298*
(.0228)
 N=260,641 N=1,270,753 N=1,270,753 
Each column denotes a separate regression.  The sample includes women between 22 and 30 years of age. 
Also included in the specifications are year-of-birth indicators. The U.S. specifications also include state 
dummies; the Norway specifications include municipality indicators.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the state/municipality level in columns (1) and (2). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at the state-year level in column (3). 
* denotes statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Appendix Table 3: 
Timing of the Implementation of the Reform in Norway 
Dependent Variable:  Year of Reform 
  Coefficient Standard error   
County2 -1.95 .65  
County3 5.02 5.23  
County4 -.64 .70  
County5 -.88 .67  
County6 -.90 .62  
County7 -1.21 .63  
County8 -1.90 .64  
County9 -1.21 .64  
County10 -2.20 .71  
County11 -.54 .63  
County12 -1.4 .60  
County13 -.45 .70  
County14 1.23 .59  
County15 -1.54 .58  
County16 .04 .60  
County17 -1.21 .57  
County18 -.26 .65  
County19 -2.77 .71  
Share of Fathers with Some College .92 3.88  
Share of Mothers with Some College 12.30 8.31  
Father?s Income (mean) -.007 .004  
Mother?s Income (mean) -.01 .01  
Father?s Age (mean) .11 .16  
Mother?s Age (mean) -.12 .19  
Size of Municipality/100 -.03 .03  
Unemployment Rate 1960 -6.22 11.63  
Share Workers in Manufacturing 1960 1.15 3.05  
Share Workers in Private Services 1960 5.95 6.23  
Share Labour Vote 1961 2.34 2.19  
Constant term 1969.14 6.95   
Robust standard errors.  All variables are municipality level variables. 
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Appendix Table 4:  Effect of Compulsory Schooling Laws on the Probability of 
Birth Conditional on Not Al ready Having a Child, Equal Weighting of Cohorts, 
United States Data 
Dependent
Variable
Birth at 
16/No prior 
birth
Birth at 
17/No prior 
birth
Birth at 
18/No prior 
birth
Birth at 
19/No prior 
birth
Birth at 
20/No prior 
birth
      
Dropout Age=16 .0000 
(.0007)
-.0008
(.0015)
-.0014
(.0015)
-.0030
(.0021)
-.0034
(.0025)
      
Dropout Age=17 -.0013 
(.0010)
-.0033
(.0019)
-.0056*
(.0022)
-.0091*
(.0038)
-.0083*
(.0030)
      
Dropout Age=18 .0011 
(.0013)
-.0093*
(.0031)
-.0109
(.0055)
-.0120
(.0081)
-.0106*
(.0039)
      
White -.0218* 
(.0017)
-.0260*
(.0027)
-.0226*
(.0036)
-.0100*
(.0031)
.0040
(.0035)
      
N 1,572,513 1,545,369 1,493,288 1,414,844 1,311,693 
Estimates are marginal effects from ordered probit estimation. Each column denotes a separate regression.  
The sample includes women between 20 and 30 years of age. Also included in the specifications are year-
of-birth indicators and state dummies.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level. 
* denotes statistically significant at the 5% level.
